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The Strategic Partnership Agreement between the EU and Japan:  
The Pitfalls of Path Dependency?1 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the current attempt by the European Union and 
Japan to negotiate a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). Sitting 
alongside negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), 
this SPA represents an attempt to reignite bilateral relations between 
these two global powerhouses. Still confined by the origins of their 
institutionalised partnership in 1991, this article argues that both sides 
find it hard to break away from earlier functional and normative 
assumptions about their relative significance and about each other, in 
order to forge a new meaningful, overarching partnership. It examines the 
development of Japan-EU relations building up to the preparations for 
this SPA, against the background of path dependent processes of 
engagement. Path dependency in its various forms ‘views institutions as 
“carriers of history,” which maintain existing behavioural norms and 
cultural patterns throughout time’ (Vergne and Durand 2010, 738). 
Despite some of the problems such claims elicit, as will be explored 
below, this article proposes that path dependency – and a particular focus 
on ‘imprinting’ - offers a useful starting point for explaining the apparent 
institutional inertia and incremental change that characterise much of this 
bilateral relationship today.  
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path dependency, Strategic Partnership Agreement 
  
Introduction  
There is no single template for Strategic Partnership Agreements (SPAs). 
Since the 2000s, this generic label has been used by the EU to describe a 
range of activities with ten of its most significant state partners across the 
world. These partners do not share economic behaviours, political values, 
or security interests with the EU or each other, but are deemed – broadly - 
to be ‘pivotal for addressing global challenges and safeguarding the EU’s 
core interests and objectives – mostly security and prosperity’ (Renard 
2015).2 SPAs – also known among some member states and partners 
simply as ‘Framework Agreements’ – are usually classified as political 
agreements, and may encompass cooperation in areas as diverse as 
climate change, counter-terrorism and the fight against the trafficking of 
drugs. Alongside these negotiations sit also free trade agreements (FTAs) 
– or Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – which also contain a 
diversity of ambitions, based broadly around the opening of greater 
market access. For example, the EU-China Investment Agreement is 
focused on increasing access and protection for investors in both 
markets;3 in contrast, the comprehensive FTA deal with South Korea that 
came into force in 2011 aims not only to eliminate duties on the majority 
of goods traded, but also to reduce non-tariff barriers in specific sectors 
and to increase market access in a range of enterprises. Increasingly, 
SPAs and EPAs are regarded as complementary processes designed to 
promote and enhance mutual peace and prosperity (de Prado 2014).4 In 
addition, security-related agreements can also be set within a Framework 
Participation Agreement, covering cooperation as part of the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy operations (Renard 2015). As 
these forms of agreement came to proliferate through bespoke 
arrangements during the early 2000s, in 2010 the then President of the 
European Council, Herman van Rompuy observed that: ‘We have 
strategic partners, now we need a strategy.’5 This lack of coordination sits 
at the core of many of the challenges facing the EU-Japan relationship 
today. 
 
At the twentieth Japan-EU summit held in Brussels in May 2011, then 
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, President Herman Van Rompuy of 
the European Council and European Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso agreed further to strengthen bilateral ties between Japan and the 
EU, with the promise of beginning negotiations towards an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) alongside the parallel development of a 
binding political agreement, designed eventually to go ‘beyond recurrent 
declarations of common positions on peace promotion, including 
disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, to increase strategic dialogues 
and to promote industrial cooperation’ (de Prado 2014, 27). Following a 
scoping exercise, in March 2013 Summit leaders, making reference to 
their ‘founding’ document of the 1991 Joint Declaration, agreed to ‘lift 
their relations onto a higher, more strategic plane, and make them more 
enduring.’6 They then launched negotiations for the EPA (including a free 
trade agreement), and expressed support for the general idea of a ‘Japan-
EU agreement.’ The rhetoric remained high: 
 
In recent years, EU-Japan Summits have shown that despite the 
global financial crisis and other global challenges, the EU-Japan 
relationship has inexorably gained in substance ... In sum, at the 
20th EU-Japan Summit, both parties fully grasped the rationale for 
setting political cooperation in motion again.7  
 
Observers at the heart of negotiating and promoting EU-Japan relations 
note that they have ‘entered a mature stage,’ and according to then 
President Barroso, the SPA-EPA agreement was designed to access 
‘untapped potential.’8 European Parliament representatives even regarded 
the SPA as marking ‘a turning point for an ambitious upgrade of political 
and economic relations between the EU and Japan.’9 By the time of their 
June-July 2013 meetings, the EU’s idea for a ‘Framework Agreement’ 
and Japan’s notion of a ‘Political Agreement’ had been consolidated in 
the new concept of a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement.’10 Documents 
pertaining to these negotiations make it clear that they need to be seen in 
the context of Japan-EU structural developments since the 
institutionalisation of their relations through the Hague Declaration in 
1991 and the subsequent 2001 Action Plan.11 Since that time, the 
dialogue between Japan and the EU has come to span a wide spectrum of 
interests from trade, geopolitics and energy, to issues of social well-being 
and culture (see Gilson 2011). These mutual interests reflect a history of 
cooperation and tensions, informal and institutionalised exchanges, and 
the recognition of a need to deal collectively with contemporary global 
challenges. What is more, these institutional developments demonstrated 
an attempt to shape and further define the idea of an EU-Japan strategic 
partnership, to support ‘effective multilateralism’ and to ‘promote the 
notion of responsible powers, whereby [the EU] expects that its 
recognition of the emerging powers’ enhanced status will act as an 
incentive for them to take a larger share of responsibility for the 
maintenance of global peace and security’ (Vasconcelos 2010, 65). 
Bendiek and Kramer highlight the ill-effects of path dependency when it 
comes to the choice of partner, finding that:  
 
it generally holds that the older and more consolidated the 
cooperative trade and development relations between the EU (and 
its respective member states) and its partners are, the more difficult 
it is for the EU-27 to give fundamentally new directions or 
priorities to these existing relations when they are rhetorically 
upgraded to the ‘strategic’ level (Schmidt 2010, 5).  
 
The basis upon which the origins of the current strategic partnership was 
built, therefore, has been undermined by a host of global, regional and 
national events, and yet those initial agreements set in train a number of 
expectations which, this article will argue, can make contemporary 
negotiations difficult. In short, the founding premises upon which their 
current institutional relations were built lock Japan-EU relations into 
structural and normative path dependency. This article explores the ways 
in which original ‘imprinting’ of a form of strategic partnership makes it 
very hard for Japan-EU negotiators to move forward despite the manifold 
reasons for which their partnership should represent a major global 
economic and political force today. 
 
Treading a Familiar Path 
The history of scholarship on path dependency is vast, covers a range of 
disciplines and engages with a wide set of debates and controversies, 
including from within Economics, Organisational Theory, Sociology, and 
Politics (see Alexander 2001). In recent years in particular, there has been 
considerable criticism about the ways in which the very term has been 
applied to all sorts of assertions that ‘history matters,’ to the extent that it 
has become a catch-all phrase (see for example, Hay 2007, 66). Drawing 
initially on Organisational Theory about human behaviour, the concept of 
path dependency essentially explains how patterns of behaviour persist, 
even in the face of a significant change in the environment. For Mahoney, 
it refers ‘specifically [to] those historical sequences in which contingent 
events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have 
deterministic properties’ (2000, 507). There are several ways to navigate 
the route taken by a path once established and many scholars focus on the 
‘self-reinforcing sequences characterized by the formation and long-term 
reproduction of a given institutional pattern,’ which leads to ‘increasing 
returns,’ whereby a pattern becomes embedded and the processes of 
reproduction of the original pattern become reinforced (Mahoney 2000, 
508). Thus, once mechanisms and norms of behaviour are set in train, it is 
very difficult to change them, even where more efficient options might 
seem appropriate. As suggested below, moreover, this patterning can 
institute a normative as well as a structural framework for behaviour 
(Sewell 1996, 62-64). A number of critics of this position suggest that 
this creates a ‘dismal science,’ one that is ‘endlessly demonstrating that 
actors are doomed to keep re-enacting their past legacies’ (cited in Bell 
2011, 885).  Others are critical that such accounts are static and ‘largely 
bracket the issue of change’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1998, 16). In most 
literature on path dependency, early events are seen to depend on 
‘contingency;’ namely, they cannot be explained by examining foregoing 
events. The issue of contingency is particularly thorny in literature on 
path dependency and in its narrowest reading it involves a stochastic 
process, something that is irreducibly unexplainable (Bennet and Elman 
2006, 254). 
 
Much of the literature on path dependency focuses, then, on a static 
reading of a contingent historical moment. In response to these critiques, 
Marquis and Tilcsik advanced the idea of ‘imprinting,’ drawn from the 
work of Stinchcombe, who suggested that environmental conditions can 
determine many of the characteristics of an organisation. The originating 
phase, then, leaves a ‘persistent mark,’ which has the effect of shaping 
‘organizational behaviours and outcomes in the long run, even as external 
environmental conditions change’ (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013, 196). This 
concept, moreover, is similar to the findings of Thelen and Steinmo, who 
observe that by ‘shaping not just actors’ strategies…but their goals as 
well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, 
institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on 
political outcomes’ (1998, 9). In this way, Marquis and Tilcsik recognise 
that the ‘stamp’ of the environment exerts an early and profound 
influence, but they do not negate the possibility of change. The 
continuation of patterns of behaviour once created also relies on the ways 
in which the stamped-in features continue to influence behaviour through 
structures and norms (see Mahoney 2000). Indeed, for Perkmann and 
Spicer, imprinted forms can be subsequently ‘augmented,’ through the 
reinforcement of core values and through opposition to any values seen to 
lie outside that core (2014, 1785). Those same underlying values, for 
Greenwood and Suddaby, give ‘coherence’ to the institution (cited in 
Perkmann and Spicer 2014, 1785). Thus, the structures and norms 
underpinning institutions derive from embedded ‘conceptions of the 
normal’ imprinted at a foundational stage, and leading to persistence and 
the reproduction of forms of behaviour, and the shaping of strategies and 
goals (see Manners, cited in Diez 2013, 195; and Thelen and Steinmo 
1998). Against this background, the present article seeks to examine – 
within a particular historical moment – those structures and norms which 
have become embedded in the institutionalised relationship between 
Japan and the EU (see also David 1994). In terms of institutional 
structures, it examines the ‘imprinting’ of structural mechanisms, in both 
formal and informal institution-making; including foundational 
documents, and arrangements for meetings and the means of establishing 
institutional memory. The goals of the institution are also shaped by these 
structures, whilst more subtle influences of power and authority can be 
determined by the remit and external credentials bestowed upon a given 
institutional arrangement. Alongside these structures, the normative 
foundations of the institution are imprinted based upon the historical 
experiences of those determining the founding documents. As will be 
suggested below, the context in which Japan-EU ties were institutionally 
and normatively cemented represented an historically momentous era 
defined by the apparent victory of the free market and of democracy. 
 
Building a Strategic Partnership between Japan and the EU 
The US-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 determined the path of Japan’s 
foreign policy for the decades to follow, and this enduring document 
continues to bind Tokyo to the foreign policy decisions of Washington 
today. Moreover, the military and strategic protection afforded by this 
treaty enabled Japan to pursue an economics-first strategy of regrowth 
and successful reintegration into the international political economy. At 
the same time, this bilateral relationship ensured that Japan remained 
politically and economically distant from its own region and that it made 
only slow progress in engaging with the newly developing European 
Community in the 1960s and 1970s (see Gilson 2000; Hook et al. 2005). 
Across the world, Western European states – bolstered by their own 
alliances with the US – were preoccupied with the rebuilding of their 
war-torn economies, ensuring sustained peace and rehabilitating Germany 
by establishing what was to become the European Economic Community 
(EEC), the precursor of the European Community (EC) and today’s EU. 
By the 1970s Japan had the attention of a concerned and critical Europe, 
worried about the rapid growth in Japanese direct investment and the 
penetration of the European market by Japanese goods. The second boom 
period of the 1980s saw the EC’s share of Japanese direct investment 
(mostly in office and telecommunication machinery and equipment) 
increase from eleven to twenty one per cent (Hook et al. 2005: 306-7). 
This led to considerable criticism in the EC (and US) against Japanese 
trade practices. Following the 1985 Plaza Accord (to drive down the 
value of the US dollar) and changes in Japanese export practices (to shift 
assembly to Europe and elsewhere abroad) the trade imbalance worsened 
for Europe as Japanese direct investment intensified, leading to trade 
disputes and the imposition of restrictions such as voluntary export 
restraints (Oppenheim 1991, 287; see also Gilson 2011). By the late 
1980s, trade concerns were to be matched by political interests. 
Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, the 
Japanese government recognised the need not only to take advantage of 
the new emerging markets of former Eastern Europe, but also to engage 
with the growing political engine of the European bloc and to recognise 
the growing impact of regional endeavours across the world. Moreover, 
the apparent triumph of democracy in the wake of the so-called ‘velvet 
revolutions’ intensified debates about the nature of contemporary security 
and gave greater voice to those who highlighted the role of ‘human 
security’ in promoting both freedom from want and freedom from fear, as 
well as the challenges of achieving them in practice (Acharya 2001). It 
was against this background that the 1991 Hague Declaration was signed 
between Japan and the EC. 
 
The short Hague Declaration put in place an institutional framework to 
ensure continuity of dialogue, by building in particular on an expanding 
EC, an economically thriving Japan, and existing institutional 
arrangements based around economic imperatives. These arrangements, 
still in place today, include annual summits, ministerial and parliamentary 
contacts and thematic dialogues. It set out as its key objectives: the need 
to strengthen international organisations, most notably the United Nations 
(UN), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, precursor to 
the World Trade Organisation) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD); the need to support 
democratisation, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and in Asia; 
and the desire to cooperate on international issues wherever possible 
(European External Action Service 1991). In terms of its fundamental 
principles, it codified a set of generalised values and a joint understanding 
of the need for democratisation and a free market economy, and has 
become the touchstone of Japan-EU relations since that day (see Gilson 
2000). The structures and norms of the Hague Declaration were re-
emphasised in the 2001 Action Plan that issued from the expanding 
Japan-EU dialogue, and which sought more explicitly to shape a 
‘common future’ (European External Action Service 2001). The new Plan 
recognised institutional changes within Europe and the Asia Pacific, the 
need to address ‘new’ global issues, such as international terrorism, and a 
joint commitment to starting a significant dialogue on climate change and 
the environment. It also included a strategic dialogue on East Asian 
security and discussions about the pursuit of a secure energy supply. The 
December 1998 European Council conclusions introduced the expression 
‘strategic partnership’ to the EU’s official vocabulary with reference to 
Russia, and the term was first applied to EU-Japan relations in 2001. 
Subsequently, it came to be used in numerous official documents within 
Europe and Japan, including the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), 
which reviewed the importance of partnerships with key countries and 
organisations, but without further clarifying the objectives to be achieved 
or the list of partners;12 and annual Japanese Diplomatic Bluebooks 
which highlighted the importance of intensifying cooperation with the EU 
in order ‘to advance effectively Japan’s diplomacy in the international 
community.’13 These initiatives were explicitly underpinned by Articles 
21 and 22 of the Treaty on European Union, identifying partners sharing 
‘democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law.’14 The term was fully 
inaugurated at the 18th EU-Japan Summit in May 2009. This trajectory 
reflects Renard’s view that ‘all ten current “strategic partners” of the EU 
were chosen “more by accident than by strategic reflection,”’ and the case 
for the partnership with Japan was built upon the founding documents of 
1991 and 2001 and the incremental developments since that time (2012, 
6). The formulation of the EPA and SPA needs to be understood in the 
context of these two documents, as they provided and reinforced the 
institutional imprint upon which today’s relations between Japan and the 
EU are based. Today, the original institutional foundations remain in 
place, as annual high level summits and ministerial meetings continue to 
provide the key focus for bilateral relations. Sectoral dialogue was 
envisaged by the original framework, and has expanded to include, for 
example, regulatory reform dialogue and stronger cultural activities 
through the creation of ‘EU Centres’ since 2009. Cooperation within 
international forums was always regarded as a core point of engagement 
for Japan and the EU and in these arenas there has been closer dialogue 
on, for example, piracy and the environment, as illustrated below. 
 
Against this background, in the 2010s the desire to achieve an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) issued from the stark reality of figures that 
speak for themselves. At that time, this bilateral pairing brought together 
the world’s first (EU) and third largest economies, jointly accounting for 
one third of the world’s GDP and more than one fifth of world trade. 
Today, they stand as second and fourth, respectively.15 The EU continues 
to be a major trading and investment partner for Japan, and in 2014 
contributed to approximately ten per cent of Japan’s total trade 
volumes.16  For the EU, the anticipated benefits of the EPA include 
estimates that it could increase European exports to Japan by 32.7% and 
Japanese exports to the EU by 23.5%.17 For the negotiators within the 
EU, an EPA with Japan would add an ambitious free trade agreement, 
one designed to cover a vast array of areas from the reciprocal 
liberalisation of goods and services, to the elimination of non-tariff 
barriers and the facilitation of EU business entry to public procurement in 
Japan.18 Moreover, a range of sectoral agreements sit at the heart of the 
negotiations; from the financial sector and information and 
communication technology, to agriculture, fisheries, and urban 
development.19 All of these factors have come to be included within the 
broader pursuit of an EPA between Japan and the EU. In terms of the 
Strategic Partnership Agreement, too, there are obvious affinities between 
the two sides. Thus, contemporary mutual areas of concern include 
international terrorism, illegal drugs trafficking and the trafficking of 
humans, climate change and cyber-attacks. All of these security concerns 
require a comprehensive and collective response.20 For many years, Japan 
and the EU have engaged bilaterally in a number of areas of joint 
cooperation, including mutual concerns over Russia, peace keeping and 
the mutual pursuit of energy security (see Hook et al. 2011, 300-1). 
 
In spite of this growing list of obvious areas of common interest, there 
have been some fundamental structural shifts in the global context within 
which Japan and the EU work, not to mention in the very composition 
and nature of the two partners themselves. As a result, the structural and 
normative frames of reference upon which this partnership was imprinted 
have changed and are worth exploring here. 
 Structural determinants 
The structures within which Japan and the EU continue to engage with 
one another have changed at both international and local levels since 
2001. At the level of international affairs, the growing relevance of 
regions was imprinted onto the original fabric of the Hague Declaration, 
as the (Western) world perceived the triumph of capitalism with the fall 
of communist regimes, a move that was met by attempts by most of 
former Eastern Europe to enter the EU. The rise of regions as units of 
international economic activity – notably in the forms of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the 
EC - meant that economies of scale and multilateral approaches to 
contemporary problems were increasingly promoted. For Japan of course, 
access to the vast European market was crucial, and factories strategically 
located in Poland and Romania, for example, were designed to gain direct 
access to that much broader market. In this way, Japan had a foothold in 
the new European economy once these countries started to gain full 
membership of the economic community and to benefit from the lower 
transaction costs it afforded. From a European perspective, as noted 
above, Japan was a major economic player at the end of the 1980s, a 
democratic ally in a growing region, and a potential bridge to China. 
Following the rise of regions, the 2000s also saw a proliferation of FTAs 
around the world, creating what Dent observed to be a ‘lattice’ of 
economic regionalism (2006, 203). Elsewhere, he observes that the trend 
towards FTAs ‘inevitably meant that less time and fewer resources in 
trade diplomacy have been spent on WTO negotiations at a time when the 
future of the global multilateral trade system is in the balance’ (2013, 
973). Hamanaka similarly examines concerns about the ways in which 
FTAs further erode the multilateral trading system (2015). Against this 
background of an apparently failing WTO and concurrent rise of FTAs, 
today the Japan-EU relationship finds itself located within a triangle of 
‘mega FTAs.’21 As Japan goes to sign its participation in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the EU pushes on with the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US, there is concern 
that the Japan-EU deal should not be left at the wayside.22 Competition 
among these different initiatives also raises the question as to whether 
these concurrent negotiations ‘will act as a stepping-stone or a stumbling 
block to reach an efficient and successful EPA/FTA between the EU and 
Japan.’23  
 
In addition to a changing international context, the very nature and 
composition of the two sides of the Japan-EU relationship have altered 
significantly since the signature of the 1991 declaration. First, the ‘EU’ 
(which formally became that only in 1993) has expanded its membership 
from twelve member states in 1991 to 28 members in 2015. The 2004 
enlargement alone added a population and GDP increase ‘equivalent to 
more than half of Japan’s population and close to 10 per cent of Japan’s 
GDP’ (Hook et al. 2005, 311). In addition to membership enlargement, 
institutional changes within the EU mean that, for example, the role of the 
Commission has expanded so that it speaks for Europe on trade matters. 
In particular, the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, 
introduced majority voting for the Council of Ministers in more policy 
areas, strengthened the role of the European Parliament, and created the 
position of a long-term President of the European Council and a High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
More recently, severe tensions have arisen within the EU about its future 
membership and remit. The failure of the euro following the global 
recession of 2008 derived from unsustainable government debt in a 
number of countries, most notably Greece. An initial €200 billion 
stimulus agreed by the EU member states in December 2008 to boost 
growth was insufficient to stop the crisis. By the following year, concerns 
had grown and Greek debts had reached a record high of €300 billion, 
equal to 113 per cent of GDP.24 As a result, in 2011 the EU established a 
permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, worth around 
€500 billion. But this was not enough to stop the crisis, and UK Foreign 
Secretary William Hague in 2011 called the euro a ‘burning building with 
no exits.’25 Subsequent austerity measures assuaged some concerns but 
ensured the clear demarcation of a ‘them’ and ‘us’ Europe. Dinan noted 
that the crisis ‘revealed serious divergences among Member States and 
rifts among national governments that are bound to make the conduct of 
EU institutions and governance even more challenging in the years ahead 
(2011, 119).  
 
This grave situation was brought into sharper relief over the 2014 and 
2015 ongoing crisis over refugees in Europe, painfully demonstrating the 
EU’s apparent inability to deal with this monumental problem 
collectively. Indeed, the EU’s ‘stumbling response’ to this crisis has for 
some ‘become symbolic of Europe’s inability to act together.26 
Furthermore, disagreements over EPA negotiations with Japan also issue 
from the fact that the European Commission desires an EU-only 
agreement (giving the EU exclusive competence) whilst some member 
states are of the view that any agreement should retain shared 
competence, especially in areas such as energy and education. 
Tyszkiewicz observes that such internal disagree makes an already ‘long 
and cumbersome procedure’ even more difficult (2013). The UK 
referendum on continued membership of the EU in June 2016 took place 
against this background.  
 Second, expectations derived about Japan in the late 1980s have not been 
met. Japan plummeted into recession shortly after the signature of the 
Hague Declaration. The so-called ‘lost decade’ followed the collapse of 
asset prices and was followed by further recession. The Nikkei stock 
market lost more than sixty per cent of its value between 1989 and 1992 
and between 1995 and 2002 Japan’s annual average growth rate of GDP 
was only 1.2%.27 Cargill remarked how this picture stood in ‘stark 
contrast to Japan’s previous postwar record of economic growth, financial 
stability and progress towards financial liberalization’ (2000, 37). Ten 
years later, in 2012 The Economist observed that Japan was ‘40 to 50 
percent below what the world in 1991 would have estimated,’28 and it 
was against this background that Prime Minister Abe returned to power in 
2012 with a ‘sense of urgency’ to reform the economy and foster growth 
through his ‘three arrows’ of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and 
structural reform to boost growth.29 It is this third of the arrows that Abe 
seeks to locate through the EPA deal.30 As demand for Japanese products 
within Europe continued to fall in 2015, moreover, the earlier enticement 
to shift Japanese manufacturing to Europe meant that Japan suffered from 
the decline in exports to the regional bloc.31 Whilst ‘Abenomics’ has its 
supporters (see, for example, Inoguchi 2014), this approach has been 
labelled as ‘voodoo’ by Katz, who sees a hollowness in the victories 
claimed by the prime minister; thus, whilst he boasts the increases in 
employment he fails to address the problems related to irregular labour 
and the real-term loss in regular work. He notes too that the rise in 
consumption tax has undone any positive outcomes of fiscal stimulus 
(2014). In addition to these factors, Japan was fundamentally pushed to 
agree to the new EPA and SPA by the regional competition raised by 
South Korea’s free trade agreement with the EU, which came into force 
in 2011. For de Prado, the EU-South Korea agreement was particularly 
significant as it enabled the EU to develop relations with a complex Asian 
market. And whilst it benefited South Korean export industries – notably 
motor vehicles and electronics – it placed Japanese exporters at a 
disadvantage. As a result, the elimination of EU tariffs through the EPA 
is fundamental to Japan’s export sector, whilst the EU seeks to link such 
tariff removal to the elimination of duties and non-tariff barriers on 
European goods in Japan (Commission Staff Working Document 2012). 
Whilst in 1991 economic agreements between Japan and the EU were 
pursued by two sides in the ascendant, in 2015 both the external and local 
economic contexts have changed. 
 
Abe’s pursuit of geopolitics alongside financial reform underlines the 
other major strand of Japan’s interests during these past two decades; 
namely, the rapid rise of the ‘China threat’ to Japan’s economy, its 
security and its position in East Asia (Inoguchi 2014). The Hague 
Declaration was signed at the end of the ‘friendship era’ between Japan 
and China, and Japan was left to face the rise of China as it presented 
many ‘challenges and opportunities … clouded by uncertainties 
(Mochizuiki 2007, 739 and 746). Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre, Japan had moved swiftly to bring China back into the 
international fold. However, this event and a number of other factors – 
including territorial issues and the Chinese nuclear tests of 1995– began 
to sow seeds of significant wariness in the minds of Japanese politicians 
and people towards China. For Mochizuki, this period represented 
‘balancing and engagement’ during the 2000s, which also heralded a 
stronger pursuit of regional arrangements to counter the China ‘problem’ 
(2007, 746; see also Terada 2010). Much has been written in recent years 
about Japan’s resurgent nationalism in response to the concerns about 
China, and Prime Minister Abe’s return to office in 2012 marked a 
distinctly stronger Japanese tone towards Beijing (see Pempel 2015; 
Pugliese 2015). Furthermore, problems arising over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands especially after 2012 elicited ‘another cycle of mistrust and 
tension’ and the Japanese government showed its determination to deal 
with Beijing in a ‘resolute manner’ (Suzuki 2015, 96). Simultaneous to 
this change in Sino-Japanese relations, the US-Japan Security Treaty also 
came under attack for its lack of relevance in the contemporary era, and 
Abe launched his controversial proposal to revise the Japanese 
Constitution to permit the so-called ‘Self Defence Forces’ to be deployed 
overseas if Japan or a close ally is attacked (Genser and Brignone 2015). 
These illustrations demonstrate that the very nature and perspectives of 
the actors who signed the Hague Declaration have been altered 
dramatically, as have the external structures and environment they 
inhabit. Linked to these changes are the normative developments over the 
past two decades or so. 
 
Normative determinants 
Scholarship on the normative project of the EU is widespread, not least in 
the work of Diez, who takes as his starting point the original definition by 
Manners, that norms shape ‘conceptions of the normal,’ and that in this 
way the EU seeks not simply to articulate and achieve material goals, but 
also to transmit a particular worldview through the ‘force of ideas’ (Diez 
2013, 195 and 197). Much of this normative power has been framed 
around the pursuit of the spread of democracy and a neoliberal market, 
and the fundamental protection of human rights.32 For Diez, this 
‘civilising’ role is closely linked to the EU’s normative power and a 
project of neo-colonial hegemony (cf Manners 2006, 175), and the EU’s 
attempts to shape its strategic partnerships may also be read through this 
normative lens. As noted above, alongside this external projection of the 
EU’s own role and purpose lie those changes internal to the EU’s 
membership since 1991, which have further intensified debates about 
whom the ‘EU’ represents and whose interests are being met by that 
projection. Norms underpinning Japan’s own foreign policy since the 
1990s have also come under intense scrutiny and debate, as Japan’s 
material influence within and beyond its own region has waned and as it 
continues to wrestle with the notion of ‘normalcy’ in the contemporary 
global structure, against the background of the challenges posed by China 
and questions about the enduring value of the US-Japan Security Treaty 
(see Hook et al. 2011). Given these internal concerns, the apparently 
shared pursuit of the norms of a global neoliberal market, democracy, and 
a certain conceptualisation of security – as set out in 1991 and 2001 – in 
fact masks different approaches to these fundamental issues. 
 
First, the pursuit of opening economic spaces is central to Japan-EU 
relations still today. However, their focus is not on jointly creating mutual 
spaces for opportunity, but rather on maximising self-interest through the 
creation of reciprocal spaces of opportunity. To this end, moreover, the 
espoused promotion of regional endeavours has also been challenged, 
both through the intra-regional difficulties faced by the EU over the past 
several years in particular, and through the direct competition over 
regional design in East Asia. The latter is most notably articulated by 
Japan’s preference for the all-inclusive East Asia Summit and China’s 
more exclusive ASEAN Plus Three process, as well as its recent creation 
of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.  Ongoing debates 
over the nature of regional engagement, moreover, are reflected in 
discussions regarding the distinction between the EPA and SPA, with the 
latter frequently depicted as a mechanism to support the former. In 
reality, most of the ‘strategic’ partnership meetings revolve around 
economics-enhancing activities, such as the Japan-EU Industrial Policy 
Dialogue, the ICT Dialogue, the Railway Industrial Dialogue, the 
Symposium on Employment, and the dialogues on aviation and 
fisheries.33 Although it can be argued that the nature of contemporary 
negotiations is complex and subject areas are often intricately 
interconnected (Allen and Smith 2011, 215), the link between the SPA 
and EPA has been disputed by the Japanese side, with reference to the 
human rights clause, as noted below.34 
 
Second, democratisation lay at the heart of the Hague agreement, coming 
as it did in the immediate wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall. The 
Declaration’s Preamble states that Japan and the EU are ‘conscious of 
their common attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights,’ as well as being ‘conscious of their common attachment to 
freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights; joint contribution 
towards safeguarding peace in the world.’ The Action Plan subsequently 
ensured that these foundations remained in place, stressing as it did 
common values including a ‘belief in peace, freedom, democracy and the 
rule of law, respect for human rights and the promotion of sustainable 
development.’ In these ways, the bilateral relationship was framed within 
a mutually accepted idea of behaviour and expectations, setting 
conditionalities for future actions, and thereby laying out a normative 
agreement as to what ‘strategic’ relationship actually means. In the 
current negotiations over the SPA, certain cleavages in understanding the 
normative underpinnings of the relationship have been exposed. Most 
notably, the EU has used the negotiations over the SPA to push Japan for 
the abolition of its death penalty, and to secure better treatment in 
Japanese prisons. In addition, the European Parliament has lobbied to 
ensure that any agreement includes a clause on suspending or not 
completing the SPA if their ‘commonly declared values’ are not respected 
(de Prado 2014). More tellingly still, the EU is calling for a clause that 
allows Brussels to suspend the EPA if Japan engages in human rights’ 
violations. The EU insists that this move represents a mutual respect of 
human rights, but Japan opposes the requirement, not least on the grounds 
that it believes that the EU is trying to apply a policy aimed at developing 
countries to a member of the Group of Seven major industrial nations. 
Despite the fact that this element of the negotiations is designed in 
practice to pave the way for eventual talks with China, Tokyo points out 
that the EU places no such impositions on its free trade agreement talks 
with the US. 35 In essence, Hosoya agrees that Tokyo and Brussels have 
taken different pathways towards interpreting shared norms and finds that 
whilst ‘it is relatively easy to draft joint declarations in which the sharing 
of norms is mentioned, reaching concrete agreements on how to 
implement them can be more agonizing and frustrating’ (cited in de Prado 
2014). 
  
Third, the pledges made in the Action Plan focused on how ‘Promoting 
Peace and Security involves strengthening the UN, opposing WMD 
[weapons of mass destruction] and promoting Human Rights.’ The 1990s 
saw the active promotion of human security and civilian power in the EU 
and Japan, but events in the intervening years suggest that the EU’s focus 
is on human rights and freedom from fear whilst Japan’s is on freedom 
from want and that it retains an holistic approach to the term, focused as 
it is more on ‘economic development and community building than by a 
clear definition of what human security actually represents’ (Bosold and 
Werthes 2005; see also Edström 2003). Since 2001, moreover, the very 
nature of security has changed and thus the normative imprint is as 
problematic as the structural one, as security interests now include cyber-
crime, strategic dialogues and industrial cooperation. Recent areas of 
cooperation have included working together on missions to improve 
security in the Republic of Niger and the Republic of Mali, as well as 
anti-piracy activities off the coast of the Somalia.36 Although the recent 
turn of events in Japan has elicited support from the EU, whose leaders 
have shown approval for Japan’s efforts to develop a ‘proactive 
contribution to peace,’ there is no evidence to suggest that Japan and the 
EU have become meaningful security partners since the 1990s. In these 
ways, although they continue to be driven by economic imperatives, it 
seems clear that in practice the special relationship developing in 1991 – 
based on two thriving and growing economic and growing political poles 
in a globalising world able to articulate a particular view of (human) 
security – has given way to a set of encounters leaving negotiators for 
Japan and the EU ‘struggling to find a new paradigm.’37 
 
Conclusion 
The EU and Japan together represent a dynamic and significant economic 
force, and share a number of political and security concerns and interests.  
This article has argued that the context in which they cemented their 
contemporary relations has altered significantly, the very composition of 
the ‘EU’ is unrecognisable from its 1991 form, and the role of the Japan 
in its own region and the wider world has also changed beyond 
recognition. The European Union as a term only came into being in 1993 
in a form of likeminded polities and economies seeking to develop an 
‘ever closer union.’ That aspiration has been set aside by a number of 
members, who aim to develop a ‘concentric circle’ or ‘variable geometry’ 
approach to membership and participation within complex and difficult 
current regional circumstances. Whilst significantly weakened by the 
eurozone crisis, the EU has nevertheless strengthened its institutional 
foundations through the Lisbon Treaty, but it finds itself reputationally 
weaker than it was in 1991. In the case of Japan, from riding high as a 
leading economy at the end of the 1980s, the country has experienced 
over two decades of economic failure. Alongside this, the so-called 
‘Japan-bashing’ of the 1980s gave way to the so-called ‘Japan passing’ of 
the 2000s, with a focus firmly fixed on China’s rise. Moreover, structural 
weaknesses within Japan have not been met with normative conformity, 
as Prime Minister Abe’s intended rewriting of the constitution and his 
strong position vis-à-vis China indicate. In essence, then, Japan and the 
EU are two different interlocutors from those who came together in 1991, 
and for these reasons, the initial aim of developing a strategic partnership 
has not been realised as planned.  
 
Against this background, the aim of finding that untapped potential and 
focusing on the ‘common values’ of the ‘two’ sides is a challenging 
aspiration. As was the case in 1991, the principal driver of contemporary 
EU-Japan relations is obviously economic interests. However, this is not 
built on – as it was – a notion of a particular type of (‘special’) 
relationship or on the idea that regions are growing as economic actors in 
a globalising world, but in the context of the rise of ‘mega FTAs’ and 
disillusion over international structures for economic management, 
notably the WTO. For the EU, its attention to Japan should be seen in the 
context of the preparation of bilateral agreements with other states of 
Asia, including South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam (de Prado 2014). 
Japan is simply ‘on the list,’ standing in a queue behind the EU 
agreement already in place with South Korea. In terms of security 
interests, Japan and the EU can cooperate in many areas, including civil 
and military missions and cyber security, but they are not primary 
partners in most of these endeavours. And Berkovsky is correct to 
observe an apparent European neglect for Japan, as it focuses on China 
and as its references to Japan as a ‘natural ally’ and ‘strategic partner’ 
have not been matched by ‘sufficient resources and energy to making 
sure that the political reality of bilateral cooperation kept up with the 
political rhetoric promising such cooperation’ (2012, 286). Japan, for its 
part, is embroiled in its regional relationships, particularly with the US 
and China, and looks to Europe as an important but fractured partner. For 
both sides, the promises of 1991 cannot be met in the context of today’s 
realities. 
 
The biggest problem is the path dependent creation of the idea of 
‘strategic partnerships’ set in train in the 1990s, and developed in a 
piecemeal way since then. Moreover, although the EU and Japan 
considered themselves strategic partners and they used the term in 
summit statements during most of the 2000s, that terminology did not 
appear in the summit statements of 2010 and 2011. One of the problems, 
then, is that the actors involved do not even know what ‘strategic’ means 
to them (see Schmidt 2010). The initial formulation of a strategic plan 
implied by the Hague Declaration and substantiated by the Action Plan of 
2001 was designed to create a more comprehensive relationship with 
multilateral purpose and normative underpinnings. However, by 2015 
Japan found itself on a list of important but not priority partners, housed 
within the vague notion of a strategic partnership and locked into a deal 
with the EU made in earlier times. The ‘persistence of the characteristics 
developed during the sensitive period even in the face of subsequent 
environmental changes’ means that contemporary architects of Japan-EU 
relations are misreading the actors and the setting  (Marquis and Tilcsik 
2013, 201). Thus, bilateral cooperation over issues such as market 
penetration, liberalisation, climate change, the environment, piracy and 
intellectual property rights is stymied by expectations formulated under 
different international, regional and domestic conditions. Every ten years 
negotiators try to reinvent the relationship with ever more grandiose 
rhetoric, all referencing the formative Hague Declaration as a foundation 
stone. In fact, Berkovsky is right to note that not much happened after the 
promises of 2000. Indeed, he goes on to say that negotiators were ‘far too 
ambitious in view of the fairly limited resources in Tokyo and Brussels 
dedicated to EU-Japan relations in general and the implementation of the 
Action Plan in particular’ (2012, 266). Japan and the EU need to wipe the 
slate clean, to implement functional and workable agendas, based on 
contemporary mutual interests and not constrained by outdated and 
unworkable structural or normative frames of reference. As Vivet and 
Lalande argue, technically detailed work on specific issues can be more 
productive than grandiose pledges and ‘political momentum,’ and these 
can even become the main ‘driver of the relation’ (2014). A move away 
from  a strong emphasis on strategic partnerships and the perennial search 
for institutional justification could enable interest-led, specific agenda 
building to develop and thereby translate EU-Japan cooperation into a 
meaningful and realisable set of priority areas. These could then set the 
foundations of a genuine strategic partnership to match today’s structural 
and normative realities. 
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